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EVIDENCE: THE 1982-83 TERM-TOWARDS A MORE
PROGRESSIVE AND FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
JEFFREY COLE*
I. INTRODUCTION
In reviewing the Seventh Circuit's decisions on evidentiary ques-
tions during the 1982-83 Term, two dominant themes emerge. The first
is the court's repeated insistence, in deed as well as word, that great
deference must be accorded exercises of the extraordinarily broad dis-
cretion possessed by district courts in supervising the conduct of trials.'
The court has emphasized that while this discretion is not without lim-
its, there is substantial room for the exercise of judgment and diversity
of opinion. The question is not whether a reviewing court would have
come to the same conclusion had it been the trial judge; it is whether
the decision of the district court is outside the boundaries of reasona-
bleness, ineffable though those boundaries may seem to be.
2
The second theme is the court's refusal to treat the rules of evi-
dence "as a mere collection of wooden rules in a game,"' 3 or to view the
* B.S. 1965; J.D. 1968. Mr. Cole is in the private practice of law in Chicago and is an
Adjunct Professor of Law at lIT Chicago-Kent College of Law where he teaches a course in Trial
Advocacy. He previously served as Chief of the Appellate Division and Assistant Chief of the
Criminal Division in the Office of the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois.
He has lectured on various litigation topics and is the author of: Evidence: Developments In Char-
acter Evidence, Cross Examination Rules, and Prior Consistent Statements, 56 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
279 (1980); MAKING THE DECISION TO SUE, (Chamber of Commerce of the United States 1979);
The Exclusionary Rule in Probation and Parole Revocation: Some Observations on Deterrence and
the 'Imperative of Judicial Integrity', 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 21 (1975); Defense Counsel and the
First Amendment. W Time to Keep Silence and a Time to Speak', 6 ST. MARY'S L. J. 347 (1974);
Impeachment With Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence: Coming to Grips with the Perjurious De-
fendant, 62 Nw. J. OF CR. L. AND CRIM. 1 (1971); Impeaching With Unconstitutionally Obtained
Evidence.- Some Reflections on the Palatable Fruit of the Poisonous Tree, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 25
(1968); Comment,Ad&'tur-Procedural Boon or Constitutional Calamity, 17 DE PAUL L. REV. 175
(1967); Note, Vicarious Liability-Abrogation of The Both Ways Rule, 16 DEPAuL L. REv. 478
(1967).
I. See, e.g., United States v. Serlin, 707 F.2d 953, 957 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Hamann, 688 F.2d 507, 512 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Bouye, 688 F.2d 471, 476 (7th Cir.
1982); United States v. Bruscino, 687 F.2d 938, 941 (7th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 1235 (1983). See also United States v. Baskes, 649 F.2d 471, 481 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1000 (1981).
2. See Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 857-58 (1982); United States
v. Bouye, 688 F.2d 471, 476 (7th Cir. 1982). Cf., NLRB v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U.S. 219,
236 (1947).
3. United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 66 (1944).
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trial process as a sporting event in which the most adroit player
prevails. In varying contexts, the Seventh Circuit has stressed that in
overseeing trials, the district courts are not engaged in some arid scho-
lastic exercise, but in the very real and serious business of seeking to
fairly resolve disputes between anxious and contentious litigants.
Thus, time and again, the court has rejected inflexible constructions of
the Rules of Evidence as inconsistent with the mandate of Rule 102
that the rules "shall be construed to secure fairness in administration,
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."
In what follows, I shall discuss those cases which are likely to have
an impact on future decisions or which present issues that recur with
some frequency in cases tried in the district courts. Since "[c]rowded
dockets make it impossible for judges, however able, to probe every
case to its foundations", 4 some of the court's opinions are not as com-
prehensive as one might wish. Others, surprisingly few in number
given the court's substantial output, seem wrongly decided. In the
main, however, the opinions are basically solid, marked more by good
sense and sound instincts than by what Judge Friendly has called "the
overarduous performance of bead-games for the applause of the law
reviews." 5
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS OR
ACTS UNDER RULES 403 AND 404
A.
In June, 1896, the wealthy and notorious Baroness de Valley was
found strangled in her apartment in Paris. In due course, Messrs. Kies-
gen, Ferrand, Lagueny and Truel were called to the dock to stand trial
for the grisly murder. In addition to proof of their actual commission
of the crime, extensive evidence was presented to the jury reflecting on
literally every facet of the character of the accuseds. Thus the jury was
informed that one of the defendants was an habitu6 of the saloons and
women of the Latin Quarter. Another was, as a young man, a member
of a gang of bicycle thieves and later, an agent for houses of ill fame. A
third, as the jury was told, was the son of an unfortunate woman who
seemed to have done some "questionable errands" for the victim and
had died insane two years before the trial. A fourth lived as a street
4. B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 5 (1924).
5. H.J. FRIENDLY, On Entering The Path Of The Law, in BENCHMARKS 31 (1960).
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peddler, hawking dogs or newspapers and sleeping in public refuges.
In the fullness of time, he became quite adept at arranging assignations
for young girls. Not surprisingly, the jury convicted all of the
defendants. 6
On the Continent, this class of evidence "is given great considera-
tion, and is freely used."' 7 Its "indubitable relevancy ' 8 is based on "the
teaching of human experience" 9 that a "bad" man is more likely to
commit crimes than a "good" one. While it is clear that this class of
evidence was also resorted to without limitation in early English prac-
tice,'0 for nearly three centuries, a very different rule has prevailed in
Britain.
Between 1670 and 1680, the courts of England came to realize the
dangers posed by the indiscriminate use of character evidence. Out of
that new awareness was born a principle of the law of evidence now
deemed fundamental: the prosecution cannot, in its case-in-chief, intro-
duce evidence of a defendant's evil or unsavory character to demon-
strate that he acted in conformity with that character.
This policy of exclusion, which obtained in America from the very
beginning of the Republic, has received unquestioned judicial sanction,
"more emphatic with time and experience. It represents a revolution in
the theory of criminal trials, and is one of the peculiar features, of vast
moment, which distinguishes the Anglo-American from the Continen-
tal system of Evidence.""
The principle of exclusion is not one of logic, but of deeply felt
intuitions of policy. "The inquiry is not rejected because character is
irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury
and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general
record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular
charge." 12
6. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 193 at 644-45 (3d ed. 1940).
7. Id at 646. Accord Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 480 n.17 (1948).
8. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 6, §193 at 646.
9. Id at 644 quoting State v. Lapage, 57 N.H. 275, 299 (1876).
10. Id at 646.
!1. Id, §194 at 647.
12. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948). No less eminent authorities than
Dean Wigmore and Mr. Justice Cardozo have said that "[tihe natural and inevitable tendency of
the tribunal-whether judge or jury-is to give excessive weight to the vicious record of crime
thus exhibited, and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge, or to take the
proof of it as justifying condemnation, irrespective of the accused's guilt of the present charge." I
WIGMORE, supra note 6, §193 at 646; People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 198, 172 N.E. 466, 468
(1930). See also 2 J. WEINSTEIN, M. BURGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 404[04] at 404-26 (1982).
The rule prohibiting evidence of character to prove propensity is a conspicuous illustration of
one of Mr. Justice Holmes' most famous insights:
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This policy of exclusion has never been without exceptions. It has
long been recognized that if, entirely apart from the matter of propen-
sity, the evidence has independent relevance, such as tending to prove,
inter alia, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity or absence of mistake or accident, it may be admissible. 13 It
must then be determined by the court that the evidence's probative sig-
nificance is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consid-
erations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cu-
mulative evidence.
14
These common law principles have been codified in Rules 404 and
403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.' 5 In numerous opinions, the Sev-
enth Circuit has articulated criteria which must be satisfied for evi-
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellowmen, have had a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should
be governed. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Howe Ed. 1963).
13. See Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618 (1949); United States v. Michelson,
335 U.S. 469, 475 n.8 (1948); Moore v. United States, 150 U.S. 57, 61 (1893); 2 WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE, supra note 12, 404[18] at 404-99. The use of character evidence arises in two signifi-
cantly different ways. First, character itself may be an element of a crime, claim or defense, and
thus under the pleadings is a material operative fact which must be proved if the party is to prevail
under the substantive law. Under these circumstances, character is in issue, and character evi-
dence does not fall within the general prohibition. In this situation, the evidence is not being
offered to prove that the person acted in conformity with his character on a particular occasion,
but rather is introduced because character is an operative element of a claim or defense. See 2
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 12, 404[021 at 404-16.
The second way in which character evidence may be used is circumstantially to suggest that
the person acted on the occasion in question consistent with his character. As the text above
explains, the circumstantial use of evidence by the government in its case-in-chief to prove
probability of guilt is rejected both by the common law and Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. To the general prohibition against this use of character evidence are several important
exceptions. It is the use of character evidence to prove intent, motive and so on that is pertinent to
the present discussion.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Ostrowsky, 501 F.2d 318, 321 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Hines, 470 F.2d 225, 228 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 968 (1973).
15. Rule 404. Character Evidence Not Admissible To Prove Conduct; Exceptions;
Other Crimes
(a) Character evidence generally.-Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.-Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conform-
ity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of mo-
tive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
Rule 403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or
Waste of Time
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
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dence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to be admissible under Rule
404(b). While the cases vacillate somewhat on at least one of the crite-
ria, they do enunciate certain basic tests: evidence of the other crime
must be similar and close in time to the offense charged in the indict-
ment;' 6 it must be clear and convincing;' 7 it must be related to an is-
sue 18 which is disputed by the defendant;' 9 and the probative value
must not be outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 20
16. The cases are not harmonious. See United States v. Dothard, 666 F.2d 498, 504 (11th
Cir. 1982) (4 years too remote); United States v. Jimenez, 613 F.2d 1373, 1376 (5th Cir. 1980) (1
year too remote); United States v. Berkwitt, 619 F.2d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 1980) (5 years not too
remote); United States v. McGovern, 82 CR 387 (N.D. Ill.) (McMillen, J.) (9 years not too
remote).
17. See United States v. Moschiano, 695 F.2d 236, 245 n.14 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 110 (1983); United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102, 106-07 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
946 (1979); United States v. Feinberg, 535 F.2d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929
(1976). Contra United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 910 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 920 (1979); United States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076, 1090, 1091 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976). See also 2 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 12, 404[10] at 404-
56. This test is satisfied by direct testimony of a witness with firsthand knowledge. See United
States v. Moschiano, 695 F.2d at 245 n.14; United States v. O'Brien, 618 F.2d 1234, 1239 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 858 (1980). Whether anything less will suffice is an open question in this
Circuit. Compare United States v. Maestas, 554 F.2d 834, 838 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972
(1977) (circumstantial evidence sufficient).
18. Some opinions have said that the other acts must have "'substantial relevance' " to an
issue other than general criminal character. See United States v. Verkuilen, 690 F.2d 648, 656 (7th
Cir. 1982) (emphasis added). The difference between relevance and substantial relevance, if any,
has yet to be explained.
19. United States v. Feinberg, 535 F.2d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929
(1976). It is in relation to this requirement that the decisions are least consistent. In United States
v. Price, 617 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1979), the defendant argued that since he denied receiving any
payoffs, the issue of intent was undisputed, and it was error to have admitted evidence of other
payoffs. While the court pointed out that the issue had been raised by portions of the defense's
opening statement and cross-examination, its holding was clear: since the government was re-
quired to prove intent, other crime evidence was admissible even if the defense did not treat it as a
real issue. Id. at 459-60. In United States v. Miroff, 606 F.2d 777, 780 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 928 (1980); United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 935 (1980); United States v. Weidman, 572 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821
(1978); and United States v. Zeidman, 540 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1976) other crime evidence was
allowed even though the defendant had not put the issue of intent in question. Cf. United States
v. DeJohn, 638 F.2d 1048, 1052 n.4 (7th Cir. 1981). In United States v. Berkwitt, 619 F.2d 649,
654, 655 (7th Cir. 1980), the Feinberg formula was repeated, although the issue of intent was
disputed in the defendant's opening statement. See generally, 2 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra
note 12, at 404[09]. Price and Berkwitt demonstrate that where the opening statement or the
cross-examination raises questions about intent, the matter is then in dispute. See also United
States v. Green, 643 F.2d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Hall, 653 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir.
1981).
20. See United States v. Moschiano, 695 F.2d 236, 243 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
110 (1983); United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102, 106 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 946
(1979); United States v. Fairchild, 526 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942 (1976).
This balancing test is a function not of Rule 404(b), but of Rule 403. From time to time, the
Seventh Circuit has suggested that use of the other crime evidence is not admissible unless it is
"necessary". See, e.g., United States v. DeJoh, 638 F.2d 1048, 1052 n.4 (7th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d at 106. This is not a "test" easily administered. See 2 WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE, supra note 12, 404[09], 404[18]. See generally Symposium: Rule 404(b) Other Crime
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
Despite more than a century of judicial discussion and considera-
tion, no part of the law of evidence is more consistently litigated than
that having to do with the admissibility of evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts. 2 ' In the 1982-83 Term, several cases came before the
court presenting controversies under Rules 403 and 404. The appel-
lants in these cases were not sympathetically received by the court. In
most instances, the issues were uncomplicated and the court's affirm-
ance predictable.
22
Other cases, however, presented substantial and important ques-
tions. Of these, the most significant was United States v. Moschiano .23
There, the defendant admitted his involvement in certain heroin trans-
actions, but claimed he was entrapped. To rebut this defense, the gov-
ernment sought to prove the defendant's predisposition, i.e., his prior
willingness to commit the crimes with which he was charged. This it
did through the testimony of an undercover DEA agent, who described
how one month after the return of the indictment, Moschiano illicitly
offered to purchase $50,000 worth of Preludin tablets for resale to truck
drivers. The jury rejected the claim of entrapment and convicted Mos-
chiano and his co-defendants.
On appeal, the argument was advanced that evidence of crimes
subsequent to those charged in an indictment is irrelevant to prove pre-
disposition and is inadmissible, per se, under Rule 404(b). 24 In re-
jecting this argument, the court began with the "well established"
principle that evidence of a defendant's criminal acts prior to those
charged in the indictment to rebut an entrapment defense by proving
predisposition is admissible under Rule 404(b). 25
Evidence. The Need For A Two-Step Analysis, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 635 (1977); Annor.:,Admissibil-
ity, Under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Of Evidence Of Other Crimes, Wrongs, Or
Acts Similar To Offense Charged To Show Preparation Or Plan, 47 A.L.R. FED. 781 (1980); An-
not.:, Admissibility, Under Rule 404(b) of Federal Rules of Evidence, Of Evidence of Other Crimes,
Wrongs, Or Acts not Similar To Offense Charged, 41 A.L.R. FED. 497 (1979); Annot.,Admissibility
In Federal Criminal Conspiracy Prosecution of Evidence of Defendant's Similar Prior Criminal Act,
20 A.L.R. FED. 125 (1974).
21. See Crowley, Modernizing and Liberalizing the Law OfEvidence, 57 CHI. KENT L. REV.
191 (1981). There continues to be criticism of the basic rule itself. See Uviller, Evidence of Char-
acter to Prove Conduct. Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice In the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845
(1982).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Hamann, 688 F.2d 507, 513 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 1255 (1983) (Rule 403 not violated by using letters from defendant's prison file as basis for
handwriting comparison); United States v. Green, 680 F.2d 520, 523 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 1255 (1983) (Rule 403 not violated by hearsay statement of victim of murder, "that little nigger
is still bothering me", offered to prove victim's mental state).
23. 695 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 110 (1983).
24. Id at 243-44.
25. Id. at 243. While perhaps correct, the applicability of Rule 404 in entrapment cases is not
quite as "well established" as the court suggested. Prior to the Federal Rules, other crime evi-
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While conceding, perhaps unnecessarily, that subsequent criminal
acts are less probative on the issue of predisposition than prior ones,
the court emphatically declared-although it did not pause to prove-
that the commission of similar crimes following the indicted offense
does have a tendency to make it more probable that the defendant was
predisposed to commit the offense charged. Consequently, the court
refused to adopt aper se rule of inadmissibility.26 As a matter both of
principle and precedent, the court's conclusion is eminently sound.
The springs of conduct are, as the Supreme Court has observed,
subtle and varied;27 "[h]uman nature, like human life, has complexities
and diversities too many and too intricate to be compressed within a
formula. ' 28 In dealing with questions of predisposition, juries are re-
quired to make judgments involving the "complexities and diversities"
of human behavior and motivation in all their myriad aspects. Thus,
whether a particular person is predisposed to commit a particular crime
at a particular moment in time plainly cannot be determined in the
abstract by resort to any general, fixed rule.
29
That there are hazards in any attempt to prove the state of a per-
dence was always admissible in entrapment cases, subject of course to the court's discretionary
control. See Annot., 61 A.L.R. 3d 293 (1975). Following the adoption of the Rules, however,
little consideration was given to their applicability in cases involving entrapment. The Seventh
Circuit appears to be one of the few courts of appeals to have concluded that Rule 404 governs
admissibility of other crime evidence in such cases. While courts today routinely admit 404(b)
type evidence in entrapment cases, they do so, as Judge Weinstein has noted, without analysis of
how this evidence fits into the framework of the Federal Rules of Evidence:
The Advisory Committee Note is silent on whether it viewed entrapment as a de-
fense in which one of the elements is the predisposition of the accused, thereby making
the accused's character an issue in the case. The courts, since the enactment of the Fed-
eral Rules, have continued to admit evidence of the defendant's character when entrap-
ment is raised, as they did under previous law, for the most part without analyzing how
this use of character evidence fits in under Rule 404. See discussion at 404[04], infra. It
has been suggested that "the best method of reconciling the entrapment rule with Rule
404 is to consider it a rule of substantive law beyond the reach of the Evidence Rules.
2 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 12, 404[03] at 404-20.
While Moschiano does not explain the basis for its conclusions, the court's opinion in United
States v. Murzyn, 631 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981), on which it relied,
does contain a comprehensive and careful analysis of the intertwining of Rules 403, 404 and 405
and the use of other crime evidence in entrapment cases. Murzyn also teaches that the extent to
which such evidence may be used is a function of the extent and nature of the testimony it is
designed to rebut. Compare Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 484 (1948) ("The cross-
examination [of a defendant's character witnesses] may take in as much ground as the testimony it
is designed to verify.").
26. 695 F.2d at 244.
27. Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968).
28. B. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE 92 (1931). See also Mirizio v. Mirizio, 248 N.Y.
175, 175 (1928) (Cardozo, J.) ("We have refused to compress within a formula the extenuating
possibilities of behavior in all its myriad diversities.").
29. Especially inadequate is a formula which is bottomed solely on a chronological relation-
ship between two events (i.e., whether the "other" crime was committed before or after the offense
charged).
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son's mind at a given moment in time is quite true. However, save at
too great a cost, we cannot avoid these risks by resort to a rigid rule of
exclusion which is contradicted by human experience, "of all teachers
the most dependable." 30 "[T]he undoubtedly grave problem of provid-
ing adequate safeguards against convictions of the innocent must be
solved in some way other than that of refusing to allow reasonable in-
ferences to be made."
31
Every day, in courts across the Nation, juries "pass upon knowl-
edge, belief, and intent-the state of men's minds-having before them
no more than evidence of their words and conduct, from which, in or-
dinary human experience, mental condition may be inferred. ' 32 Thus,
the question is not whether the "other crime" occurred before rather
than after that with which the defendant has been charged. The in-
quiry is whether, as a matter of ordinary human experience, predisposi-
tion can reasonably be said to be evidenced by subsequent criminal
acts. The command that "[r]ealities must dominate judgment" 33 is per-
haps more urgent here than in other areas of the law.
Common experience leads irresistibly to the firm conclusion that
following the termination of a government-created crime, 34 the truly
entrapped defendant-that is, one who lacked the predisposition to
commit the crime-generally will not engage in additional criminal ac-
tivities. Consequently, evidence of criminal activity subsequent to the
alleged entrapment does have, at the very least, some tendency to
demonstrate predisposition. 35
30. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381 (1933).
31. United States v. Allen, 159 F.2d 594, 598 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.), cert. denied, 330 U.S.
838 (1947). See also United States v. Davis, 437 F.2d 928, 933 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J.) ("The
importance of minimizing. . . prejudice does not outweigh the necessity for preserving otherwise
fair and accepted procedures."); United States v. Franzese, 392 F.2d 954, 960 (2d Cir. 1968)
(Friendly, J.), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310 (1969)("[wlhile rehabilitation of this sort
[i.e., reference to witnesses' fear of defendants] may well have a spill-over effect, the process is
essential to development of the truth and reliance must be placed on trial judges to prevent unfair
tactics by the prosecution.").
32. American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 411 (1950). See also
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 487 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("I believe it to be
unprofitable, on balance, for appellate courts to formulate rigid rules for the exclusion of evidence
in courts of law that outside them would not be regarded as clearly irrelevant in the determination
of issues.").
33. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933). See also Di Santo v.
Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 43 (1927) ("[Tlhe logic of words should yield to the logic of realities.").
34. By definition, the defense of entrapment rests on the notion that the government is the
architect of the crime. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); United States v. Burkley,
591 F.2d 903, 910-11 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 966 (1979).
35. As such, the evidence is relevant. Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines
relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the threshold for admissibility is
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The argument can, of course, be made that subsequent criminal
activity may be the product of a capacity or predisposition for crime
first awakened by the government's entrapment, and that as a conse-
quence, subsequent criminal activity does not necessarily prove prior
predisposition. In some cases, this argument may be true. In others, it
will not be. Yet, it is this uncertainty of human behavior which makes
inappropriate a rigid rule of inadmissibility-a rule which, by depriv-
ing the jury in appropriate cases of relevant evidence, would skew the
fact finding process.
The argument for aper se rule of exclusion is, as Moschiano held,
lacking in judicial support. In a very long line of cases, the federal
courts and those of the several states have held repeatedly that post-
offense conduct is admissible on the issues of intent and motive as well
as on the question of predisposition. 36 This is not to suggest that evi-
dence of post-offense criminality, regardless of its nature, should al-
ways be admissible. Arguments which favor universal admissibility are
as dangerous and analytically unsound as those which favor universal
inadmissibility.
For the court in Moschiano, the principle of compromise between
these polar positions is to be found in Rules 403 and 404. Thus, evi-
dence of subsequent acts is admissible if it meets the tests for the ad-
missibility of other crime evidence discussed earlier, and its "probative
value is [not] substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. ' ' 37  Finding those tests satisfied, the court of appeals af-
firmed the convictions in Moschiano .38
The question of the admissibility of subsequent acts was also ad-
dressed in United States v. Serlin ,39 which involved a conviction for
quite low. United States v. Murzyn, 631 F.2d 525, 529 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923
(1981).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 486 F.2d 1081, 1084 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Pfingst, 477 F.2d 177, 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 941 (1973); United States v. Nathan, 476
F.2d 456, 459-60 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Gaus, 471 F.2d 495, 501 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 938 (1973); United States v. O'Connor, 433 F.2d 752, 754-55 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 911 (1971); United States v. Marine, 413 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1001 (1970). Cf. United States v. Compton, 355 F.2d 872, 874 (6th Cir. 1966). See also Annot., 92
A.L.R. 3d 545 (1979).
37. Fed. R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added).
38. 695 F.2d at 245. The court rejected the claim that since one crime involved preludin,
while the other involved heroin, the crimes were dissimilar. The court noted that both transac-
tions reflected the defendant's involvement in large scale distribution of narcotics. It is the type of
activity involved not the nature of the drug that was pivotal. The court also summarily dismissed
the arguments that: (i) the 3 months between the crime charged and the subsequent crime
stripped the latter of any evidentiary value; and (ii) that the government's need for the subsequent
act evidence was so slight as to warrant its exclusion. 695 F.2d at 245.
39. 707 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1983).
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failure to file income tax returns. At trial, the district court allowed the
government to introduce evidence that the defendant had also failed to
file a tax return in 1978, the yearfollowing those which were the subject
of the indictment.
In affirming the conviction, the court reiterated the familiar princi-
ple that proof of other wrongs or crimes, while not admissible to show
that the defendant is a "congenital evildoer and therefore guilty of the
crime charged," is admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b) to show motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence
of mistake or accident. 40 The court held that the defendant's failure to
have filed his 1978 return was "indicative of a conscious plan to evade
taxes and hence proves that the earlier failures were also the product of
a willful design."
41
The panel found that Rule 403 had not been violated by the other
crimes evidence and that the probative value was not outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice. The court then turned to the "novel
claim" that the evidence of willfullness was so overwhelming that ad-
mission of the defendant's 1978 non-filing amounted to prosecutorial
overkill which was violative of the due process clause.
42
While conceding that the "availability of other evidence of a de-
fendant's guilt may be relevant under Rule 403 in determining whether
to admit questionable evidence," 43 the court emphatically rejected any
notion that the due process clause delimited or defined the quantum of
otherwise admissible evidence the prosecution could introduce in a
criminal case. "Evidence of guilt, while it undoubtedly works to the
detriment of the accused, is not unfairly prejudicial." 44
B.
Rule 404(a)(1) is an exception to the general prohibition against
the circumstantial use of character evidence to prove probability of
guilt. The rule allows a defendant to offer evidence of his good charac-
ter45 to demonstrate that it was unlikely that the defendant committed
the crime charged.46 Once the defendant has introduced evidence of
40. 707 F.2d at 959.
41. Id at 959.
42. Id. at 959-60. The court expressed some difficulty in understanding this argument.
43. Id at 959 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 960 (emphasis added).
45. FED. R. EVID. 405, which prescribes the allowable methods for proof of character, envi-
sions the use of reputation or opinion evidence.
46. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948).
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good character, the government may introduce contradictory character
evidence.
Interesting questions under Rule 404(a)(1) were before the court
during the 1982-83 Term in United States v. Gaertner.4 7 There, the
defendant admitted that he had cocaine in his automobile, but denied
that he intended to deliver it to Brian Maas, a government agent. It
was the defendant's contention that he was holding the cocaine as col-
lateral for a loan he had made to one Haman, a government informant.
The district court ruled, in limine, that the defendant's two prior convic-
tions for possession of marijuana would not be admissible for impeach-
ment if he chose to testify since, in his view, the danger of unfair
prejudice outweighed the probative significance.
Having obtained this favorable ruling, the defendant testified in
his case-in-chief about his alleged loan transaction with Haman. He
claimed that he had told Haman if the loan was not repaid in 24 hours,
he would flush the drugs down the toilet since he was not "into the
cocaine thing, the . ..drug thing." He returned to and amplified on
this theme when he later testified that he "certainly didn't need to be in
a situation where [he] was related to any drug transactions no matter
how off-handed or left handed it was and [he] didn't need the exposure.
I. . . wasn't into that."
4 8
At the close of the direct examination, the court concluded that the
effect of the defendant's sweeping testimony was to put in issue his
character for "clean-living". 49 Accordingly, the district court reversed
itself and permitted cross-examination regarding the prior marijuana
convictions pursuant to Rule 404(a)(1). 50 A conviction followed.
On appeal, the defendant contended that the cross-examination
was impermissible under Rule 404(a)(1) since the prior drug convic-
tions were not "evidence of a pertinent trait of his character." The
court of appeals held the evidence to have been properly admitted and
affirmed the conviction. While the result is undeniably correct, the un-
derlying rationale is somewhat opaque.51
47. 705 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1983).
48. 705 F.2d at 215 (emphasis added).
49. 705 F.2d at 215-16.
50. The rule allows character evidence to be used by the government to rebut "[elvidence of a
pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused .. " In United States v. West, 670 F.2d
675, 682 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1124 (1982), the court noted that neither Rule 404(a)(1)
nor any of the cases interpreting it defined the term "character trait". Relying on Professor Mc-
Cormick, the court suggested that it refers to elements of one's disposition such as honesty, tem-
perance, or peacefulness.
51. Upon a first reading the opinion seems to hold that by testifying as he did, the defendant
put his character in issue within the meaning of the rule. A more careful reading fails to confirm
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The opinion begins with an in haec verba quotation of Rule
404(a)(1). Then, although they are separate concepts, distinct from the
principles of Rule 404(a)(1), the court immediately recited the general
rules that when a defendant testifies, he can be impeached like any
other witness and that felony convictions are available for impeach-
ment. 52 Thereafter, follows this statement:
When Gaertner testified that he was not into the "drug thing", he
obviously put his character in issue by attempting to portray himself
as a "clean liver" in the eyes of the jury. Once the defendant deniedhe
was involved in the "drug thing" he raised the issue and opened the
door on the question of hisprior orpresent drug involvement, and thus
we agree with the trial court and hold that the evidence of Gaertner's
prior drug experiences, including his drug (marijuana) convictions
was admissible to impeach his testimony and his credibility as a
witness. 3
There can be no quarrel with the court's conclusion that once the
defendant falsely sought to suggest to the jury that he was "a clean
liver" and had no prior involvement in drug trafficking, it was permis-
sible to introduce the prior convictions. As the court noted, two distinct
purposes were served by this evidence. First, under the principles of
general character impeachment, the jury had the right to consider prior
felonies as bearing on the defendant's overall credibility as a witness. 54
Second, the evidence served to contradict the specific testimony
relating to prior lack of involvement in drugs. This holding is consis-
tent with the decisions of the Supreme Court and those of the Seventh
Circuit that, in order to prevent open affronts to and distortions of the
fact finding process, a witness who voluntarily injects into the trial the
question of his prior lack of criminal involvement (or some other im-
portant matter), opens the door to a cross-examination which might
otherwise not have been permissible. 55
this initial impression and leaves the scope, content, and applicability of 404(a)(1) anything but
clear.
52. Rule 404(a)(3) provides, inter alia, that a witness may be impeached with character evi-
dence as provided in Rule 609. That rule, in turn, allows impeachment by felony convictions or
misdemeanors involving crimenfalsi. The court in Gaertner made no mention either of Rule 609
or Rule 404(a)(3).
53. 705 F.2d at 216 (emphasis added).
54. See 2 WEINsTEIN's EvIDENCE, supra note 12, T 404105] at 404-38 ("Although many courts
speak of the defendant as putting his character 'in issue' when he introduces good character evi-
dence, the terminology is misleading; the issue is not whether defendant is 'good' but whether he
committed a given act, and the evidence is being used circumstantially to show that a person of
such character is unlikely to have committed such an act.").
55. The classic case is Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), where the court allowed
unconstitutionally obtained evidence to be used to impeach a defendant who falsely testified he
had never possessed narcotics. See also United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1975) (doc-
trine of curative admissibility); United States v. Johnson, 506 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1974) (doctrine of
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The more difficult questions, unanswered by the opinion,56 are
whether a defendant's sweeping assertions of clean living can effec-
tively inject character evidence into the case within the meaning of
Rule 404(a)(1); whether evidence of prior narcotics dealing can only be
used for impeachment rather than as rebuttal character evidence within
the meaning of 404(a)(1), even though it contravenes Rule 405's prohi-
bition against proof of character save by reputation or opinion
evidence.
57
It remains for future cases to clarify Gaertner and explicate the
applicability of Rule 404(a)(1) in comparable cases. What is clear be-
yond any doubt, however, is that defense counsel must take special pre-
cautions to insure that testimony does not become so sweeping as to
open the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence.
C.
The cases decided during the 1982-83 Term teach anew that deter-
minations under Rules 403 and 404 cannot be made mechanistically;
they are not a kind of catechism, the mere invocation of which will
solve necessarily diverse evidentiary problems. Realizing that it "is
hardly in a position to reevaluate, based on a cold record, the helpful-
ness of certain testimony or the subtle balancing of factors contained in
Rule 403",58 the court has continued to champion the view that the
"highly judgmental" character of Rule 403 mandates that "[a reviewing
curative admissibility); United States v. Jansen, 475 F.2d 312, 316 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
826 (1973) (defendant's claim that he was never convicted of any crime opened door for govern-
ment to show misdemeanor conviction); Esquire Restaurant, Inc. v. Commonwealth Inc. Co. of
N.Y., 393 F.2d 11I, 117 (7th Cir. 1968). Accord People v. Westek, 31 Cal. 2d 469, 190 P.2d 9, 13,
18 (1948); Molton v. People, 118 Colo. 147, 193 P.2d 271, 272 (1948); State v. Barnett, 156 Kan.
746, 137 P.2d 133 (1943). See also Cole, Impeachment With Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence:
Coming To Grips With The Perjurious Defendant, 62 Nw. J. OF CR. L. AND CRIM. 1 (1971). Com-
pare United States v. Johnston, 690 F.2d 638, 646 (7th Cir. 1982) (en banc); United States v.
Cavale, 688 F.2d 1098, 1112 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 380 (1982) (cross-examination
opened door to government's use of damaging evidence even though question was withdrawn);
United States v. Allain, 671 F.2d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 1982) (cross-examination of witness' involve-
ment in marijuana dealings opened door for government to show that defendant purchased mari-
juana from them with counterfeit currency).
56. At one point, the court said that by his testimony, Gaertner obviously put his character in
issue. However, it later stressed the prior convictions were used solely to impeach credibility and
seemed to suggest that absent this limited use of the evidence, a different result might have ob-
tained. 705 F.2d at 217.
57. The admission of the evidence in Gaertner for impeachment purposes obviously differs
theoretically from use under 404(a)(1). In the former situation, the jury is cautioned that the
evidence can only be considered insofar as it might bear on the defendant's credibility. Rebuttal
character evidence is not subject to any such cautionary instructions. While Walder v. United
States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) does not specifically address the question, it seems to suggest that the
evidence is admissible merely to impeach credibility. See id. at 65.
58. Bohannon v. Pegelow, 652 F.2d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 1981).
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court] not restrike the balance" itself.5 9
This theme was the cynosure of the court's en banc decision in
United States v. Bruscino .60 Speaking for seven of the eight members
of the court, Judge Posner held that whether exposure to prejudicial
publicity had an effect on the jury's verdict is to be determined by the
district court employing the reasonable possibility standard. However,
the proper standard of appellate review is vastly different, it is whether
the district court's determination constitutes an abuse of discretion:
The trial judge will always be in a better position than the appel-
late judges to assess the probable reactions of jurors in a case over
which he has presided. He has had the opportunity to observe the
jurors' demeanor and gauge their attentiveness, as the appellate
judges have not. He can also judge, as we cannot, whether the at-
mosphere of the trial-the congeries of intangibles that no steno-
graphic transcript can convey [6 1]-might have made the jury
receptive to being prejudiced by the documents in question, or, for
that matter, might have inoculated it against such prejudice. As we
cannot put ourselves in the district judge's shoes in these matters we
ought to accept his judgment unless we have a very strong conviction
of error.
62
While not decided under the Rules, the underlying rationale of
Bruscino applies equally to review of discretionary decisions under
Rule 403. For those who find in Bruscino a dilution, if not an outright
abdication, of the appellate function, it is well to remember that appel-
late judges, no less than other men and women, are "normally vain,
they have ambitions, party leanings, a decent human share of
prejudice, passion and blindness. . . [and vary in their intellectual en-
dowments], imagination, and training." 6 3 Thus, as Mr. Justice Cardozo
59. United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1345 (7th Cir.), ceri. denied, 444 U.S. 833
(1979). However, district courts are not free to do as they please, as is vividly illustrated by the
Second Circuit's interesting reversal of one of Judge Weinstein's decisions. See United States v.
Jamil, 707 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1983).
60. 687 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1205 (1983).
61. In his informative book, THE ART OF ADVOCACY 39-40 (1954), Mr. Lloyd Paul Strycher
has said this of "atmosphere":
Atmosphere, that nothing, that vague and intangible something, that everything, is a
vital element in the trial, and within limits the advocate may stimulate it, for whether he
would or no, there is a general feeling that permeates the courtroom, the judge, and
above all the jury-a kind of indoor climate of opinion. If favorable, it can help, some-
times more than any evidence. But if it turns hostile, the strongest proofs may not
prevail.
62. 678 F.2d at 941. See also Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 171 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) ("[A] few minutes' observation of the parties in the courtroom is more informing than
reams of cold record."); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 625 (1948) (Burton, J., dissenting) ("In this
living record, there are many guideposts to the truth which are not in the printed record. Without
seeing them ourselves, we will do well to give heed to those who have seen them.").
63. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 130 (1960).
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has said in another context, "substitute [an appellate court's discretion]
for [that of a district judge] and you shift the center of authority but
add no quota of inspired wisdom."
64
In the last analysis, fairness in the administration of the Federal
Rules of Evidence can only be achieved if federal district judges are
truly possessed of competence, good sense, fairness and courage. If the
United States District Courts are not manned by judges with such qual-
ities, no rules, however detailed, and no appellate review, however
stringent, can do very much to make up for the lack of them.
65
III. THE CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTION RULE
Long before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in
1975, "Baron Parke's doctrine of presumed prejudice from the commis-
sion of error" 66 had fallen into desuetude, and it had become accepted
that a litigant was entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one.67 By the
early part of this Century, either as a result of legislation or judicial
decision, erroneous rulings by a trial judge had ceased to be basis for
reversal unless they affected a substantial right.68
In addition, the common law required, as a precondition to appel-
late review, that the claimed error have been called to the court's atten-
tion by timely and specific objection made at trial. This enduring
common law principle, which was always a part of the fabric of federal
trial practice, ultimately was codified in Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 69 Under these Rules, the requirement of a timely and specific
64. B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 133 (1924). In fact, this may even detract from
the validity of the decision.
65. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 488 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
66. 10 J. MOORE, H. BENDIX, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 1103.11 (2d ed. 1982). The
doctrine of presumed prejudice from the commission of error was laid down by Baron Parke
speaking for the Court of Exchequer in Crease v. Barrett, 1 CM & R 919, 932-33 (1827).
67. See Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953); Perkins v. Endicott Johnson
Corp., 128 F.2d 208, 211-12 (2d Cir. 1942); In re Barnett, 124 F.2d 1005, 1011 (2d Cir. 1942).
68. While the doctrine of presumed prejudice was at one time quite generally accepted in this
Country, by the early part of this century, American courts and legislatures, both federal and state,
had gone far toward a complete repudiation of the doctrine and in its place crafted a doctrine of
harmless error. 7 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 61.02 at 61-3 (2d ed. 1982);
8B J. MOORE, M. WAXNER, M. EISENSTEIN, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 52.01 (2d. ed. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as 8B MOORE's], FED. R. CRIM. P. 61. For a fascinating history of the evolution
of the harmless error rule in criminal cases and the strident conflict it evoked among certain
distinguished members of the Second Circuit, see M. SCHICK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT 268-76,
299-300 (The John Hopkins' Press 1970).
69. Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 30 and FED. R. Civ. P. 51, which preclude a party from
raising challenges to jury instructions in the absence of a timely and specific objection. See
United States v. Verkuilen, 690 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1982); Exxon Corp. v. Exxene Corp., 696
F.2d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 1982).
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objection was applicable to any trial error regardless of its nature.7 °
Rule 103(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence has further codified
the contemporaneous objection rule insofar as it pertains to erroneous
admission of evidence.
7'
Compliance with the contemporaneous objection rule is not dic-
tated by abstract notions of formalism. Rather, its "eminently practi-
cal" purpose72 is to expedite finality and economy in litigation by
forcing parties to make appropriate objections at the time the error oc-
curs or risk being foreclosed from raising the error on appeal. Indeed,
failure to adhere to the contemporaneous objection requirement will
generally result in a bar to review by a court of appeals of the claimed
error.
73
Calling error to the attention of the trial court gives it an opportu-
nity for correction which may obviate the need for further proceed-
ings.7 4 In this way, unnecessary burdens on an adversary system that is
already under strain are avoided, and the rights of other litigants "who
are entitled to prompt adjudication of their claims, ' 75 are not abridged.
During the 1982-83 Term, the Seventh Circuit expressed its intol-
erance of attempts to hedge the risk of an adverse verdict by failing to
object, thereby allowing, if not inviting, the trial judge to commit error.
In United States v. Knop , 7 6 the defendant was charged with having
made false statements to two different federally insured banks. The
government's evidence that the banks were insured at the time of the
submission of the false statements was far from satisfactory.
Interjected between questions relating to identification of the de-
fendant and certain documents which he had submitted to the banks,
came the question: "[Is your bank insured by the Federal Deposit
70. See 8B MOORE'S, supra note 66, at 51-6.
71. FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1) provides that:
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which
admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or
motion to strike appears of record, stating the specic ground of objection, if the
specific ground was not apparent from the context. . . . (Emphasis added).
72. Local 901 v. Compton, 291 F.2d 793, 796-97 (1st Cir. 1961) ("The rule [requiring timely
and specific objection] is both elementary and for obvious reasons eminently practical.").
73. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 690 F.2d 670, 674 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Wilson, 690 F.2d 1267, 1275 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 205 (1983); United States v.
Weed, 689 F.2d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Baskes, 649 F.2d 471, 480 n.8 (7th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. I000 (1981).
74. 1 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra note 12, 103102] at 103-11; 8B MOORE'S, supra note 66,
at 51-4. Accord United States v. Weed, 689 F.2d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 1982); Crusan v. Ackerman,
342 F.2d 611, 613 (7th Cir. 1965).
75. Maneikis v. Jordan, 678 F.2d 720, 722 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 346 (1982).
76. 701 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1983).
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Insurance Corporation? ' 77 The prosecutor never explicitly asked
whether the bank was insured at the time of the crime. In the court of
appeals, it was argued that since there was no evidence that the banks
were insured at the time of the false submissions, reversal was
mandatory.
Speaking for a divided panel, Judge Pell recognized that taken
"woodenly and literally" the testimony might seem to refer only to the
time of trial and thus would be irrelevant. However, in the context of
the overall trial, it could plausibly have been taken by the jury as refer-
ring to the time of the commission of the offenses. This conclusion was
buttressed by the fact that appellant's counsel neither objected to the
introduction of the testimony on relevancy grounds nor challenged the
proof of the bank's federally insured status, even though such an objec-
tion easily would have cured the very error urged on appeal.
Relying on Wainwright v. Sykes ,78 the majority demonstrated that
the roots of the contemporaneous objection rule are deeply embedded
in compelling considerations of finality in the judicial process. 79 And
they delivered a pointed warning to those who would refrain from
making objections so that they might "have another go at it"8 ° in the
court of appeals:
We hesitate to suggest that counsel for the defendant deliberately
engaged in a 'sandbagging' process. Yet we cannot ignore what a
unique opportunity this situation presents. Counsel aware of the
lack of pinpointing of the time to the offense could easily have ob-
jected to the question as being irrelevant because of its reference to
the insurance status as of the time of the testimony. Counsel would
also have been aware had he done so that the objection would have
been sustained and the Government could easily have brought in the
requisite proof. By saying nothing about the matter at any time at the
trial level his client could easily have a built-in claimfor reversal if the
jury should reject his defense on the substantive merits.
81
77. Id at 672 (emphasis added).
78. 433 U.S. 72, 89-90 (1977).
79. 701 F.2d at 673.
80. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U.S. 521, 542 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
81. 701 F.2d at 673 (emphasis added). See also 8B MOORE'S, supra note 66, at 51-6. One of
the more forceful pre-rules' statement of the principle is found in United States v. 5 Cases, 179
F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1951). There, the government called one
Memmoli as a witness. To each question asked, he claimed his fifth amendment privilege. No
objection was made to the lengthy series of lethal questions. On appeal, it was alleged that the
questions were so prejudicial that reversal was warranted in spite of there having been no objec-
tions raised at trial. A unanimous panel, consisting of Learned Hand and Judges Frank and
Swan, unhesitatingly rejected the argument:
After [Memmoli] had claimed the privilege, in response to the third question put to him,
it was apparent that he would continue to claim it. Nevertheless, counsel for the Gov-
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The majority refused to sanction this sort of gamesmanship and af-
firmed the conviction.
The applicability of these basic principles in civil cases is evi-
denced by Wesley-Jessen Division of Schering Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb,
Inc. 82 There, Judge Getzendanner asked experts from both sides to
recommend literature to assist her in evaluating certain evidence which
had been received during an injunction hearing. Without a whisper of
protest from the plaintiff, Bausch & Lomb's expert recommended and
delivered two texts. The plaintiff submitted nothing.
Nonetheless, on appeal, the plaintiff contended that the court vio-
lated Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence by, in effect, taking
judicial notice of non-adjudicate facts which comprised the contents of
the books provided by Bausch & Lomb. The panel found Rule 201
inapplicable since the district court did not use the books as a substitute
for evidence, but only as background information to help her interpret
the evidence which had been presented at the hearing. While this hold-
ing could have sufficed to end the matter, the panel took pains to un-
derscore its unwillingness to allow the victim of alleged prejudice to
take advantage of a situation which, by his silence, he has helped to
create.
The panel emphasized that Judge Getzendanner had, in an unbi-
ased, open and even-handed manner solicited from both parties in
open court recommendations for reference materials. Although Wes-
ley-Jessen was thus keenly aware of which reference works would be
considered, neither its expert nor its counsel made any objection until
after Judge Getzendanner had made her decision. Hence, it was "too
late now for Wessley-Jessen to complain about the judge's use of the
books." 83
ernment propounded a series of increasingly pointed questions as to each of which the
privilege could be, and was, claimed. Had this been done over the claimant's protest, it
might have been error serious enough to require reversal. As to that, we need not say;
for here, the claimant allowed the questions to go on without a whisper of objection and
then moved for a mistrial. The victim of alleged prejudice cannot be allowed to nurse it
along to thepoint of reversability and then take advantage of a situation which by his silence
he helped to create.
United States v. 5 Cases, 179 F.2d at 523 (emphasis supplied). See also United States v. Allain,
671 F.2d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Murzyn, 631 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1980) cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981); United States v. Kanovsky, 618 F.2d 229, 231 (2d Cir. 1980); United
States v. Hedgeman, 564 F.2d 763, 768 (7th Cir. 1977); Morrow v. United States, 101 F.2d 654, 658
(7th Cir. 1939).
82. 698 F.2d 862 (7th Cir. 1982).
83. 698 F.2d at 865. Seealso I WIGMORE, supranote 6, §18 at 322; Skogen v. Dow Chemical
Co., 375 F.2d 692, 703 (8th Cir. 1967):
[He] preferred to let the action of the trial court stand . . . yet retain this incident as his
"ace in the hole". After receiving an unfavorable verdict, he now attempts to revive this
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In an era of ever-spiraling dockets, 84 any procedural rule which
fairly husbands judicial resources is bound to be attractive to an adver-
sary system which, of necessity, is seeking ways to promote efficiency
and judicial economy. As the Supreme Court has said "[t]he contem-
poraneous-objection rule surely falls within this classification." 85 Knop
and Wessley-Jessen are but recent examples of the increasing frequency
with which the federal courts of appeals are harkening to the inherent
wisdom of Learned Hand's dictum that "justice is not a game" 86 and
are refusing to sanction or condone tactical violations of the contempo-
raneous objection rule. 87 Viewed from this perspective, Rule 103 and
the common law rule requiring prompt and precise objection in the
face of claimed error cannot be blithely ignored.
88
IV. THE HEARSAY RULE
It is common ground that out of court statements constitute hear-
say "only when offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted"89 Despite the ease with which the definition is stated, proper
application of the rule occasionally proves elusive. Of the cases dealing
with the hearsay rule during the 1982-83 Term, United States v.
alleged error. [Yet] it is the most fundamental rule of appellate procedure that a party
may not sit idly by and allow the trial court to commit error, wait for a verdict, and
complain of the error only if the verdict is unfavorable.
Compare United States v. Passero, 290 F.2d 238, 244 (2d Cir. 1961) (Lumbard, C.J., Magruder
and Friendly, J.J.).
84. In 1982 there were 206,193 filings in the United States District Courts. See United States
v. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984).
85. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977). Compare Federated Department Stores Inc.
v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981); Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 578, 579
(1974) (doctrines ofresjudicata and collateral estoppel properly bottomed on considerations of
judicial economy).
86. United States v. Paglia, 190 F.2d 445, 447 (2d Cir. 1951). See also H.J. FRIENDLY, On
Entering The Path Of The Law, in BENCHMARKS, 30 (1960).
87. See United States v. Allain, 671 F.2d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 1982).
88. While uttered in a very different context, Mr. Justice Cardozo's penetrating observations
in R.H. Steams Co. v. United States, 291 U.S. 54, 61-62 (1934), perhaps best enunciate the ethical
basis upon which cases such as Knop and Bausch & Lomb ultimately rest:
He who prevents a thing from being done may not avail himself of the non-per-
formance which he has himself occasioned, for the law says to him in effect 'this is your
own act, and therefore you are not damnified.' . . . Sometimes the resulting disability
has been characterized as an estoppel, sometimes as a waiver. The label counts for little.
Enough for present purposes that the disability has its roots in a principle more nearly
ultimate than either waiver or estoppel, the principle that no one shall be permitted to
found any claim upon his own inequity or take advantage of his own wrong.
89. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 219 (1974) (emphasis added). See also FED. R.
EVID. 801(c); United States v. Kanovsky, 618 F.2d 229, 231 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 308 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); Kerr v. City of
Chicago, 424 F.2d 1134 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 833 (1970); United States v. Pasha, 332
F.2d 193, 196-97 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 839 (1965); 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1361 (Chadbourn Rev. 1976); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 246 (Cleary Ed. 1972).
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Green, 9° was the most uncomplicated. Yet, as will be seen, it was not
without its subtleties.
In Green, the defendant was charged with having kidnapped
Rhonda Gillihan in Missouri and forcing her to accompany him to Illi-
nois, where he killed her. At trial, the evidence showed that on May
24, 1980, during a party at the home of Emmett Ware, the defendant
made a sexually suggestive remark to Ms. Gillihan. She left Ware's
apartment and went to a second party at which the defendant made
further remarks. At about 2:30 a.m., she left the second party to return
to Ware's apartment. The defendant followed her. Upon her arrival at
Ware's apartment, she said "that little nigger is still bothering me."91
The court of appeals held that this statement "indicated that she
was nervous and upset and that she was transported by Green without
her consent. ' 92 Since these were "essential issues" at trial, the evidence
was relevant. The court held that although the evidence was hearsay, it
was admissible under Rule 803(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which makes admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, a state-
ment of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation
or physical condition. 9
3
The court's conclusion that the evidence was admissible is obvi-
ously correct. What is somewhat problematic is its conclusion that the
evidence was hearsay requiring invocation of an exception to the hear-
say rule. In strict theory, it would have been more sound to have con-
cluded that the evidence was not hearsay at all.
Verbal utterances are often used non-assertively as indicating cir-
cumstantially a particular mental state. For example, if the state of
mind of a testatrix's sister, whether affectionate or hateful, was in issue,
the utterance of the sister that "She is too ugly to die yet", indicates
indirectly the sister's condition of feeling and is, of course, not used as
testimonial evidence of the facts asserted. 94
It is important to distinguish this circumstantial use of utterances
to prove a condition of mind from declarations directly asserting the
existence of that mental state (i.e., "I hate my sister."). In the former
instance, the hearsay rule is inapplicable; in the latter, the rule applies
with full vigor, and the exception must be invoked as a precondition to
90. 680 F.2d 520 (7th Cir.), ceri. denied, 103 S. Ct. 493 (1982).
91. Id at 521.
92. Id at 523.
93. Id. See 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 12, 803(3)[02] at 803-94.
94. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1715 at 99 (Chadbourn Rev. 1976).
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admissibility. 95
Although the question is a close one, proper application of these
principles strongly suggests that the statement in Green-"that little
nigger is still bothering me"-is not hearsay, for it was not used to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. Rather, it was employed, as the
Seventh Circuit noted, as evidence "indicat/ingl that [the declarant] was
nervous and upset. ' 96 However, as Wigmore has stressed, "[aill such
indirect uses of verbal utterances must be distinguished from direct as-
sertions of the state of mind . . . to which alone the hearsay rule ap-
plies, and for which alone it is necessary to invoke the [presently
existing mental state] exception.
'97
Far more troublesome is United States v. Gaertner.98 In Gaertner,
the defendant was charged with possession with the intent to distribute
cocaine to one Maas, an undercover agent. While admitting that he
had the cocaine in his car, the defendant contended he was not going to
give it to Maas. To support this thesis, the defendant sought to intro-
duce, on his direct examination, a conversation between himself and
one Haman, a government informant, in which it allegedly was agreed
that the defendant was to hold the cocaine as collateral for a loan to
Haman. The district court's refusal to allow the conversation into evi-
dence on the ground that it was hearsay was sustained by the Seventh
Circuit.
The panel properly recognized that where evidence is received not
to prove the truth of the matters asserted, but to form the basis from
which flowed a defendant's perceptions or beliefs-in short, his state of
mind-there is no violation of the hearsay rule. Nonetheless, the panel
concluded that the evidence of the "loan/collateral" agreement was
hearsay since it "necessarily" was offered to prove the truth of the mat-
ter asserted:
Z e. that the "loan/collateral" agreement did in fact exist. Logical rea-
soning leads to the conclusion that before the jury could believe that
the alleged loan/collateral transaction took place they would necessar-
ily have to have found credible the truthfulness of Haman's alleged
statements .99
With all deference, this conclusion cannot withstand analysis.
95. See6 WIGMORE, supra note 94, § 1715 at 99, § 1730 at 148.
96. Green, 680 F.2d at 523 (emphasis added). See generally 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra
note 12, $ 803(3)[02] at 803-94.
97. 6 WIGMORE supra note 94, § 1715 at 99. Compare 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note
12, 803(3)[02] at 803-94.
98. 705 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1983).
99. 705 F.2d at 214 (emphasis added).
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Whether the loan argeement "did in fact exist" is dependent upon
whether Haman and Gaertner in fact agreed. While the agreement is
evidenced by utterances, it does not follow that the hearsay rule is im-
plicated. As Wigmore has conclusively shown, proof of the existence of
a "contract" does not involve the hearsay rule at all, for the utterances
are verbal acts. 100
Equally flawed is the conclusion that the jury necessarily had to
"have found credible the truthfulness of Haman's alleged statements"
before "believing the alleged loan/collateral transaction took
place. . . ." It was of no moment whether Haman, the declarant, actu-
ally intended to abide by his promise to return for his cocaine and re-
pay the money allegedly lent. The only question was whether the
statements were made and thereafter generated some belief or conduct
in the defendant:
Whenever an utterance is offered to evidence the state of mind which
ensued in another person in consequence of the utterance, it is obvi-
ous that no assertive or testimonial use is sought to be made of it, and
the utterance is therefore admissible, so far as the hearsay rule is
concerned. 101
In short, it was the credibility of the defendant-not that of the declar-
ant-which was pivotal to the jury's determination. Since the defend-
ant was on the stand, under oath and subject to cross-examination,
none of the triune vices underlying the hearsay rule were present. 0
2
The "truthfulness" of the declarant's statements is no more at issue
in Gaertner than is the "truthfulness" of the declarant who makes
threats to another, 0 3 or the declarant who tells a policeman that a third
person is engaging in unlawful conduct, 0 4 or the declarant who makes
calls to the defendant's telephone desiring to place bets, 105 or the prose-
cutor who tells a defendant before the grand jury that he is being less
than candid, 0 6 or the declarant/informer whose statements are said to
constitute entrapment. 0 7 The question in all of these cases is whether
the statements were made, and that depends on the credibility of the
witness, not the declarant.10 8
100. See 6 WIGMORE, supra note 94, § 1770.
101. Id §1789 at 314.
102. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
103. See United States v. Herrera, 600 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Deropoulos,
506 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975).
104. Kerr v. Mohan, 424 F.2d 1134 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 833 (1970).
105. United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 839 (1965);
Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
106. See United States v. Kanovsky, 618 F.2d 229, 231 (2d Cir. 1980).
107. Crispo v. United States, 443 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1971).
108. See 4 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra note 12, 801(a)[02]. See also United States v.
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Finally, the evidence was also receivable under the principle that
utterances are admissible as non-hearsay when they accompany con-
duct to which it is desired to attach some legal effect. One of the salient
examples given by Wigmore involves the handing over or receiving of
money. The act itself may have a varied significance, and thus words
accompanying the receipt or delivery are admissible without offending
the hearsay rule:
The application of the verbal act doctrine is illustrated in a great
variety of instances. Some of these, presenting special complications,
may be taken up separately. In this place may be noticed sundry
classes of cases not usually complicated by other questions.
(1) The act of handing over or of receiving money may have a
varied legal significance, and words accompanying the receipt or de-
livery may therefore serve to make definite the effect of the act:
Declarations accompanying a delivery of money may therefore be
admissible, in order to determine whether a loan or a payment was
made, whether one debt or another was paid, whether it was ac-
cepted in full or in part payment, or whether any other significance is
to be attributed to the act. Declarations by either party are receivable,
except so far as a declaration by one could not legally affect the signoi-
cance of the act done by the other. °9
The third in the trilogy of cases is United States v. Chappell.I 10
Chappell presented questions under Rule 803(6) which is an exception
to the hearsay rule for records of regularly conducted business activity.
Chappell was charged with having defrauded the investors of the Gen-
eral Oil Company by making misrepresentations concerning the use of
invested funds. At trial, the books of the company were offered over
the defendant's objection that they were hearsay.
To satisfy the requirement of 803(6), the government offered the
testimony of two former employees of General Oil, both of whom
stated that Anthony Ricci was the bookkeeper for the company. In
addition, an agent of the SEC testified that the defendant had told him
that Ricci was maintaining the books of General Oil. The agent also
testified that he was a licensed certified public accountant, that he ex-
amined the books and records obtained from Ricci, and that they ap-
peared to be records made in the ordinary course of business.
He further testified that he corroborated the information contained
Anderson, 417 U.S. 211,220 n.8 (1974) ("Of course, evidence is not hearsay when it is used only to
prove that a prior statement was made and not to prove the truth of the statement.").
109. 6 WIGMORE, supra note 94, § 1777 at 274-76 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis partly in orig-
inal and partly supplied).
110. 698 F.2d 308 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2095 (1983).
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in the books and records with checks, bank statements and other
records and found that all the entries appeared accurate. Finally, and
according to the court most importantly, the government offered por-
tions of Ricci's testimony given to the SEC in May, 1977. In that testi-
mony, Ricci stated that he was the accountant for General Oil and that
he maintained the books and records. He also identified each of the
exhibits and described how he posted entries and prepared schedules.
The court held that this testimony was "clearly admissible" as an
admission by a party-opponent through his agent concerning a matter
within the scope of the agency and made during the existence of the
relationship."I' Based on this, the court held the evidence qualified for
admissibility under Rule 803(6).
V. PRIVILEGES AND RULE 501
As originally conceived, Article V of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence contained thirteen separate rules relating to privileges. However,
in place of Proposed Rules 501 through 513, Congress passed a single
rule, Rule 501, which provides, inter alia, that "the privilege of a wit-
ness. . . shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience."'" 2
In enacting this single-rule Article, Congress specifically rejected
the Advisory Committee's attempt to enumerate the recognized non-
constitutional privileges and to define their scope. Congress also re-
jected the Committee's attempt to create a uniform federal law of
privilege, mandating instead that in cases where state law governs sub-
stantively, state privilege law also shall apply."1
3
I l1. Ricci's testimony, as a party admission, does not fall into a hearsay exception but rather
is defined as not hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(D). The exclusion of party admissions from the
definition of hearsay, unlike most hearsay exceptions, is not grounded on a probability of trust-
worthiness but rather on the idea that a party cannot object to his failure to cross-examine himself.
See supra note 12, 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 801(d)(2)[01]. The fact that Ricci was no longer on
the General Oil payroll at the time that he gave testimony to the SEC was not dispositive since he
was acting as General Oil's bookkeeper. Only twelve days prior to Ricci's testimony, Chappell
himself told the SEC that Ricci was still acting as General Oil's accountant and that the books and
records were in Ricci's possession. The court held that Ricci's testimony was properly admitted as
an admission by a party-opponent and that it laid the foundation for the admission of the General
Oil books and records.
112. Rule 501 also requires application of state law of privilege on substantive questions as to
which state law supplies the rule of decision.
113. In rejecting the Committee's recommendations, Congress was motivated by a concern
that the proposed rules intruded upon legitimate state interests in having state substantive law
applied. More broadly, Congress was motivated by a concern that the proposed rules would have
tended to "freeze" standards in an area of law which Congress felt was best left to grow and
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During the 1982-83 Term, the Seventh Circuit considered two
cases under the attorney-client privilege and one which sought recogni-
tion of a psychotherapist-patient privilege. In all three cases, the appel-
lants' arguments were rejected. Two of the cases are unremarkable.
One, however, United States v. Weger, l 4 if it means what it seems to
say, poses greater dangers to the attorney-client privilege than any case
in recent memory. We begin with the cases dealing with the attorney-
client privilege.
A. The Attorney- Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for con-
fidential communications known to the common law. Its purpose is to
encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients, thereby promoting broader public interests in the observance of
law and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound
legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or
advocacy depends upon the lawyer being fully informed by the client.
In order for these ends to be realized, it is imperative that the confiden-
tial communications be free from the consequences or the apprehen-
sion of disclosure.1
5
Despite the well defined scope of the privilege," t6 the courts of ap-
peals continue to be confronted with claims that the privilege has been
violated. In United States v. Lawless,' 7 the IRS sought enforcement of
a subpoena calling for the production of documents used by Lawless in
the preparation of an estate tax return. The district court held that a
letter from one of the executors to Lawless containing detailed financial
information and a handwritten note on an envelope were privileged,
even though Lawless had made no attempt to demonstrate that the doc-
develop on a case basis and in the light of changing circumstances. See Emerging Problems
Under The Federal Rules Of Evidence 92 (American Bar Association 1983).
114. 709 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1983).
115. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
116. The general contours of the privilege are easily stated: A client may assert the privilege
with respect to confidential communications made to his attorney for the purpose of enabling the
attorney to render legal advice or services to him. He who claims the privilege has the burden of
proof of proving all its essential features. Communications made to or intended to be disclosed to
a third party are not privileged. The communication must relate to an attorney's status as a legal
advisor, and communications relating or responding to requests for business, scientific, economic
or accounting advice are not privileged. Communications made in furtherance of a crime or fraud
are outside the privilege, as are those made in the context of joint representation. See generally
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 2291-92, 2312
(McNaughton Rev. 1961); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 87 (Cleary Ed. 1972). Proposed Rule 503(b)
would merely have restated, rather than modified, the common law privilege. See 56 F.R.D. 183,
236 (1973).
117. 709 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1983).
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uments were transmitted to him with the expectation that their contents
would remain confidential rather than with the expectation they would
be used in the preparation of the return. 118
The court of appeals began with the fundamental principle that
the party claiming the privilege has the burden of establishing all of its
essential elements." 19 Satisfaction of that burden requires a document
by document or question by question assessment; "a blanket claim of
privilege is unacceptable."' 120 The court stressed that "/t]he scope of the
privilege should be 'strictly confined within the narrowest possible lim-
its.' ",121 Finally, there was the reiteration of the principle that where
information is transmitted to an attorney with the intent or expectation
that it will be revealed to a third party, such information is not confi-
dential and thus not privileged.
22
These basic principles, the court held, required reversal of Judge
Morgan's order. As the court noted, where the client expects that there
will be revelation to a third party, the privilege is inapplicable; actual
disclosure is not necessary. The second basis for reversal stemmed
from the fact that in preparing the tax return, Lawless was not acting in
his capacity as a legal adviser, but rather was performing an "account-
ing service." Therefore, the communications by definition were not
privileged. 12
3
In United States v. Weger, 124 the defendant, in 1980, had submit-
ted a title opinion to a federally insured bank, ostensibly prepared by
her attorney, Mr. Yanacheck. In fact, the document had been forged
118. Moreover, Judge Morgan stated that based on his knowledge of Lawless' work habits he
was certain that the information contained in the two documents had, in fact, been used to prepare
the estate tax return which was under criminal investigation by the IRS.
119. 709 F.2d at 487. Accord United States v. Weger, 709 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1983); In Re
Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980); FTC v. Shaffner, 626 F.2d
323 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Tratner, 511 F.2d 248, 251-52 (7th Cir. 1975).
120. Lawless, 709 F.2d at 487. Accord Radiant Burners Inc. v. American Gas Association, 320
F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963). Compare Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981) (" 'the recognition of a privilege based on a confidential
relationship . . . should be determined on a case-by-case basis' ").
121. Lawless, 709 F.2d at 487 (emphasis added). Accord United States v. Pipkins, 528 F.2d
559, 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 952 (1976). In Re Transocean Tender Offer Security
Litigation, 78 F.R.D. 692, 697 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
122. Lawless, 709 F.2d at 487.
123. Id at 487. The privilege only protects communications and disclosures made to obtain
informed legal advice. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); In Re Walsh, 623 F.2d
489 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980). The court held that even if Lawless had been
rendering legal advice in addition to his tax preparation services, the privilege was inapplicable
since no evidence was introduced to establish that the two disputed documents were given to
Lawless for any purpose other than use in preparation of the return. 709 F.2d at 487. Accord
United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922
(2d Cir. 1961).
124. 709 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1983).
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by the defendant on paper stolen from Mr. Yanacheck's office. Based
on the forged title opinion, the bank granted the defendant a loan
which she failed to repay.
An investigation was begun. To insure that there would be no sus-
picion that he or his firm had been involved in the forgery, Mr.
Yanacheck turned over to federal authorities a letter written to him in
1978 by the defendant at a time when he was counsel for her and her
family. The letter pertained to a civil suit in which the defendant had
been involved and contained a type face which was almost identical to
that on the forged opinion letter. 25 Ms. Weger was indicted.
At trial, the 1978 letter was used as the basis for expert testimony
that the style of type on the forged 1980 opinion letter and that on the
1978 letter sent by the defendant to Mr. Yanacheck were uniquely simi-
lar. The expert thus concluded that the forged document "had most
likely been typed on the defendant's typewriter." The district court
rejected the claim that the 1978 letter was inadmissible under the attor-
ney-client privilege, and the court of appeals affirmed.
The court held that the privilege was designed to protect the sub-
stance of confidential communications, not their form. Thus, since the
contents of the 1978 letter were not used against the defendant there
was no violation of the privilege. The court also held that the Canons
of Ethics allowed Mr. Yanacheck to turn the letter over to authorities
in order to insure that he and his firm would not falsely be thought to
have been involved in the crime. 126 These aspects of the court's hold-
ing are unexceptional and no doubt correct.
However, not content to let the matter rest here, the panel found it
appropriate to decide "whether the defendant waived her right to assert
the attorney-client privilege [as to the 1978 letter] when she forged her
attorney's signature [in 1980] to a purported title opinion on the law
firm's letter-head stationery."' 127 In answering this question affirma-
tively, the court said:
It should be noted that the attorney-client privilege was not created
to shield clients from charges for fraudulent conduct, and a client who
abuses the attorney-client relationship waives the attorney-client
privilege. 12
8
While the immediate holding of Weger is plain enough, it is diffi-
125. 709 F.2d at 1153.
126. Id at 1156-57. DR 4-101(d)(4) of the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility permits
an attorney to reveal confidences or secrets necessary to defend himself against an accusation of
wrongful conduct.
127. 709 F.2d at 1156-57.
128. 709 F.2d at 1156 (emphasis added) (quoting Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933)).
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cult to fix with any degree of precision either its limitations or the doc-
trinal basis on which it rests. The most troublesome aspect of the
opinion lies in its seeming holding that an "abuse" of the attorney-
client relationship results in a retroactive waiver of the privilege. If the
opinion is in fact meant to articulate such a principle, it is open to very
serious question, for nothing in Clark or the history of the privilege
begins to support it.
The proper scope to be afforded the attorney-client privilege has
long been a matter of debate. However, from the beginning there has
been virtual unanimity of opinion that no privilege attaches to commu-
nications intended to help the client in achieving illicit ends. It is not
that the privilege in such circumstances is waived; it is rather that the
privilege does not exist at all. As Wigmore has emphasized, "the diffi-
culty has been to define the boundaries of this limitation. It has not
always been kept in mind that the privilege, in its very fundamentals
presupposes. . . the furnishing of legal advice to a culpable client, as
well as to the worthy one, i.e., to a client who, if the law were duly
enforced, would lose in the litigation."'
129
However, all the reasons which justify the holding of confidences
of the guilty as well as the innocent "cease to operate at a certain
point," namely where the client seeks advice not with reference toprior
misconduct, but to accomplishfuture wrongdoing. "From thatpoint on-
wards, no protection is called for. .... ,,130 This is precisely what Mr.
Justice Cardozo said in Clark v. United States-and this is all he said:
There is a privilege protecting communications between attorney and
client. The privilege takes fight if the relation is abused. A client
who consults an attorney for advice that will serve him in the com-
mission of a fraud will have no help from the law. He must let the
truth be told.1
3 '
The panel's attempt to distill a doctrine of retroactive waiver from
an epigram eviscerated from an opinion which did not pretend to deal
with the concept of waiver-let alone retroactive waiver, is palpably
wrong. The panel's methodology cannot be squared with the Supreme
Court's oft-repeated warning that the meaning of judicial opinions is
not to be derived from a hyper-literal parsing of and preoccupation
129. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 116, § 2298 at 572 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
130. Id, § 2298 at 573 (emphasis added).
131. 289 U.S. at 15. Clark was not even an attorney-client privilege case. The issue was
whether a juror who had lied on voir-dire could be held in criminal contempt. The defendant
argued that jury deliberations were immune from scrutiny. "Searching for an analogy", the Court
looked to the fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. There then followed the quotation
cited above.
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with words, surgically excised from the broader context of an opin-
ion. 132 What Mr. Justice Cardozo said in Snyder v. Massachusetts
133
applies with singular force here:
A fertile source of perversion in constitutional theory is the tyr-
anny of labels. Out of the vague precepts of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment a court frames a rule which is general in form, though it has
been wrought under the pressure of particular situations. Forthwith
another situation is placed under the rule because it is fitted to the
words, though related faintly, if at all, to the reasons that brought the
rule into existence.134
Broadly read, Weger raises perplexing questions, as the following
paradigm demonstrates: X has an attorney-client relationship with Y
over a number of years. In 1978, X, in various confidential written
communications admits to Y past criminal wrongdoing involving
fraudulent use of stolen American Express credit cards. In 1980, X
asks Y if and how he can, in the future, engage in a scheme involving
counterfeit VISA cards and avoid detection under the mail fraud stat-
ute. Y refuses to assist X who nonetheless engages in his planned ille-
gal activities. X is indicted for mail fraud. At the trial, Y is ordered to
testify about his conversation in 1980 with X relating to the future
wrongdoing and to produce the 1978 letters in which X has admitted
past wrongdoing. 1
35
Under traditional principles, the 1980 conversation would not be
privileged and would have to be revealed. Weger, however, would also
seem to require production of the 1978 communications since the privi-
132. See, e.g., United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1980); Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 341 (1979) ("[Tlhe language of an opinion is not always to be parsed as
though we were dealing with the language of a statute."). Accord CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 385
(1981). Judge Pe's decision in The Northern Trust Co. v. Garman, 643 F.2d 1252, 1256 (7th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 910 (1981) illustrates the inappropriateness and futility of attempts to
rely on isolated words in an opinion as a basis for decision of later cases.
133. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
134. 291 U.S. at 114 (emphasis added). See also Hawks v. Hammill, 288 U.S. 52, 57 (1933)
(words have "a color and a content that will vary with the setting."); Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S.
418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.) ("A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of
a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the
time in which it is used."); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 56 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing) ("[ilt is part of wisdom, particularly for judges, not to be victimized by words."); Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) ("[it is a maxim not to be disre-
garded that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in
which those expressions are used."); NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941) (L.
Hand, J.) ("Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence;
and . . . all in their aggregate take their purport from the setting in which they are used .. ");
Holmes, Law In Science And Science In Law, 12 HARv. L. REV. 443, 460 (1899) ("We must think
things not words, or at least we must constantly translate our words into the facts for which they
stand, if we are to keep to the real and the true.").
135. The latter evidence would be sought by the government under Rule 404(b) to show
intent.
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lege was "abused" and is therefore "waived retroactively." It is outside
the purview of this Article to determine either the wisdom or the doctri-
nal soundness of such a rule, although both are dubious. The point is
to suggest that there is nothing either in Clark or the Weger opinion
itself which supports Weger's apparent conclusion. 136
To perform their proper function, judicial opinions must do more
than merely announce a conclusion which is justified not by the force
of their reasoning but by the power of their author's commission. As
Justice Stone said:
I can hardly see the use of writing judicial opinions, unless they are
to embody methods of analysis and of exposition which will serve the
profession as a guide to the decision of future cases. If they are not
better than an excursion ticket, good for this day and trip only, they
do not serve even as protective coloration of the writer of the opin-
ions and would much better be left unsaid.
137
Measured against this standard, Weger does not fare too well.
B. The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
While a physician-patient privilege is not generally recognized
under federal common law, 13 8 it enjoys substantial recognition by a
majority of the states. 139 Therefore, the privilege often must be applied
by federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction.1
40
The Advisory Committee's proposed rules would have recognized
no physician-patient privilege and would, indeed, have precluded its
assertion even in diversity actions. Proposed Rule 504 would, however,
have recognized a discrete aspect of that privilege, namely a psycho-
therapist-patient privilege. Although the question is far from clear, it
has been suggested that "it appears that perhaps under the influence of
state law and Proposed Rule 504, the federal courts are increasingly
136. The Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility would not itself authorize production.
DR4- 101 (d)(4) gives permission to a lawyer to reveal confidences to protect himself !f he is so
inclined. It does not authorize the government to obtain by subpoena those confidences which the
attorney may not choose voluntarily to surrender.
137. Letter from Justice Stone to Felix Frankfurter quoted in A. MASON, THE SUPREME
COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN 105-06 (1958).
138. See United States v. Mancuso, 444 F.2d 691, 695 (5th Cir. 1971); In Re Verplank, 329 F.
Supp. 433, 438 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Ramer v. United States, 411 F.2d 30, 39 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 965 (1969); United States v. Kansas City Lutheran Home & Hospital Association, 297 F.
Supp. 239, 244 (W.D. Mo. 1969); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 483 F. Supp. 1265,
1268 (W.D. Pa. 1980); In Re Grand Jury Subpoena, 460 F. Supp. 150, 151 (W.D. Mo. 1978);
Contra In Re Subpoena of Jorge S. Zuriga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983).
139. See Louisell and Sinclair, Foreword- Reflections On The Law OfPrivileged Communica-
tions-The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 30, 32 n.l 1 (1971).
140. The scope of the privilege is discussed at length in Emerging Problems Under the Federal
Rules of Evidence 102 (American Bar Association 1983).
616
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sympathetic to the assertion of such a privilege, though not perhaps
going so far as to absorb Proposed Rule 504 into the federal common
law." 141
During the 1982-83 Term, the Seventh Circuit avoided the ques-
tion of whether a psychotherapist-patient privilege should be recog-
nized under Rule 501. In In Re Pebsworth ,142 the court reviewed an
order requiring compliance with a grand jury subpoena for an insur-
ance carrier's records relating to insurance reimbursements. Blue Cross
and a Dr. Anita had objected to the subpoena on the ground that it
violated the psychotherapist-patient privilege established by the Illinois
Mental Health and Development Disabilities Confidentiality Act,
14 3
the common law, and the Federal Constitution. The district court held
that any privilege which might have existed was "waived through the
patients' explicit authorization of disclosure of such records to medical
insurance carriers, and their consequent expectation that the confiden-
tial character of the records would necessarily be compromised pursu-
ant to the reimbursement process.' 144
In affirming the district court's compliance order, the court of ap-
peals declined to consider whether a psychotherapist privilege existed
under Rule 501. Rather, the court affirmed the district court's order on
the basis that the patient's authorization of disclosure to the insurance
carrier constituted a waiver of any privilege that might arguably have
existed.
At the threshold, the court made clear that "the contours and ex-
ceptions of. . .privileges [under Rule 501] are clearly a matter of fed-
eral common law; state-created principles of privilege do not
control."'' 45 Thus, the fact that the Illinois Mental Health Act prohib-
ited the redisclosure by insurance carriers of the kind of information
sought by the grand jury was of no moment. The court held that any
privilege that might have attached to billing and administrative records
which were sought by the grand jury had been intentionally and know-
ingly waived when the patients assented to the publicizing aspect of the
reimbursement and claims procedure.
However, the availability of the privilege under other circum-
stances was not foreclosed. Indeed, the court cautioned that its deci-
141. Emerging Problems Under the Federal Rules of Evidence 104 (American Bar Associa-
tion 1983). Based upon the three cases cited, this conclusion is perhaps a bit overstated.
142. 705 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1983).
143. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, 1 801-17 (1981).
144. Pebsworih, 705 F.2d at 262.
145. Id
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sion might well be different if the subpoena sought involved, detailed,
psychological profiles or substantive accounts of therapy sessions.
146
Thus, whether a psychotherapist-patient privilege exists under Rule
501 is still an open one in this circuit.
VI. OPINION EVIDENCE AND RULES 701, 702, AND 703
Although not decided under the Federal Rules of Evidence, United
States ex rel DiGiacomo v. Franzen ,'147 involving as it does a question
over which there has been not a little disagreement, is, at least poten-
tially, one of the more important cases decided by the Seventh Circuit
in the 1982-83 Term. The facts are these: during the defendant's state
court rape trial, the victim told how she was forced to drive the defend-
ant to a cornfield where the rape occurred. Her identification of the
defendant was unequivocal.
Thereafter, the supervising criminologist at the Illinois Bureau of
Identification testified that a comparison between samples of the de-
fendant's hair and those found in the victim's car revealed them to be
microscopically similar and that the chances of the hair in the car being
other than the defendant's were one in 4,500. 14s
During their deliberations, the jury asked the court whether it had
been conclusively established by the sampling of hair specimens that
the defendant was in the victim's car. Shortly after the trial judge de-
clined to answer the question, the jury returned a verdict of guilty.
Following the exhaustion of his state court remedies, the defend-
ant sought habeas relief in the district court. While conceding the ad-
missibility of the testimony regarding the scientific comparison of the
hair samples, the defendant contended that admission of the testimony
of mathematical probabilities misled the jury into believing that the
state had conclusively established that he was in the car. 149 The district
court rejected these arguments, and in a relatively brief per curiam
opinion, the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
At the threshold, the court frankly conceded "that the interjection
into the criminal trial process of sophisticated theories of mathematical
probability raises a number of serious concerns."' 150 No less candid
146. Id at 263.
147. 680 F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
148. This testimony was based on a recently published study the witness had read. Id at 516.
149. Id at 517.
150. Id at 518 (footnote omitted). The court took notice of the debate in the law journals
about the use of evidence of statistical probability. See id. at 518 n.3. In light of the court's
acknowledgement of the serious nature of the question presented, which was res integra in this
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was its acknowledgement of those decisions which had refused to sanc-
tion the admissibility of such evidence.' 5' While the Seventh Circuit
"share[d] in the concern of these courts that the admission of evidence
as to mathematical probability. . . may mislead and confuse the jury",
it nonetheless refused to find, "on the facts before [it]", that its admis-
sion constituted a denial of due process.-
52
Since "[tihe Constitution does not, and, indeed, cannot guarantee
that only completely reliable evidence will be placed before the jury",
the admission of the statistical evidence-even if somewhat unrelia-
ble-did not, the court reasoned, constitute aper se violation of the due
process clause. 153 So long as a defendant was afforded the opportunity
to challenge whatever evidence was admitted, due process is satisfied.
The court noted that the petitioner's counsel had made no attempt
to cross-examine the state's expert, to challenge the validity of her con-
clusions, to call his own expert, or to correct any impressions which
might have been misleading. In fact, the court emphasized, "[elven
now, [the petitioner] does not claim that Dillon was wrong in her
conclusion. .... ,,154
In determining how far, if at all, DiGiacomo sanctions the use of
evidence of statistical probabilities in federal trials, it must not be over-
looked that DiGiacomo was a habeas corpus case. Consequently, the
sole question was whether the alleged error in the admission of the
evidence was of constitutional dimensions. 55 In a federal case, admis-
sibility will depend on the various non-constitutional factors enunci-
Circuit, the court's determination on the briefs alone is somewhat surprising. What is more unu-
sual, was defense counsel's silent acquiescence in this determination. Id at 515.
151. Id. at 518. See also Miller v. State, 240 Ark. 340, 399 S.W.2d 268 (1966); State v. Sneed,
76 N.M. 349, 414 P.2d 858 (1966).
152. 680 F.2d at 518-19. The court bottomed this conclusion on the absence in the prosecu-
tor's closing argument of (i) any claim that the statistical evidence conclusively proved that the
defendant was in the victim's car, and (ii) the absence of any attempt to blur the issue of whether
the source of the hair was the petitioner with the issue of whether he committed the crime--even
though, as the court recognized, in the case before it, these two questions "were one and the
same." Id. at 518-19.
153. Id at 519.
154. Id. at 519. There is to be sure a surface allure in this kind of argument, for if the chal-
lenged evidence is in fact true and the defendant guilty, arguments against its admissibility tend to
be viewed as much ado about nothing. Yet, there are obvious dangers in such a result-oriented
approach. If carried too far, the burden of proof is subtly shifted from the government to the
defendant. No longer is it the government which must prove the reliability of its evidence at trial,
it is the defendant who, on appeal, must prove its unreliability to gain a reversal. This approach,
which is appearing more and more in the cases, see, e.g., United States v. Winograd, 656 F.2d 279,
282 (7th Cir. 1981), is not limited to questions of evidentiary admissibility. As one perceptive
student commentator has shown, this " 'guilty anyhow' " attitude is found even where errors of
constitutional magnitude are alleged. See Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Illinois: "The
Guiding Hand of Counsel?", 59 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 901, 914 (1983).
155. DiGiacomo, 680 F.2d at 519. See also Wainwright v. Goode, 104 S. Ct. 378, 382 (1983)
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ated in the Federal Rules of Evidence-factors which are at once
substantially less rigorous and far more easily violated than is the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Before evidence of mathematical probabilities can be received in a
federal case, several basic Rules will have to be satisfied. First, Rule
702 will require that the "expert" be qualified to give an opinion on
statistical probability. If, as in DiGiacomo, the testimony is based on
extrinsic data, Rule 703 will require that the data be of a type reason-
ably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or infer-
ences upon the subject. And finally, but perhaps most importantly, the
evidence will have to pass muster under Rule 403.
Whether the evidence in DiGiacomo could have been received in a
federal trial is open to very serious question. In the court's per curiam
opinion, there appears to be some concern about the reliability of the
evidence, although there is, to be sure, a suggestion that the evidence
has some probity. 156 While the court did not, of course, address the
question of jury confusion within the context of Rule 403, there are
indications that evidence of mathematical probability could well be ex-
cluded by a judge in the proper exercise of the very considerable discre-
tion accorded under Rule 403. For, as the court conceded, statistical
evidence "may mislead and confuse the jury."
Nor was the court required to address the question of whether the
state's expert would have been qualified as an expert under Rule 702 to
testify on mathematical probabilities. Obviously, the mere reading of a
single published study would not be enough. And merely reciting to
the jury the results of a study, as was done in DiGiacomo and United
States v. Massey, 57 would not satisfy Rule 703. More importantly, this
sort of testimony would raise serious problems under the federal hear-
say rule.
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence has expanded the
scope of expert testimony. For example, Rule 703 expressly permits
experts to base their testimony on evidence that would be inadmissible
("It is axiomatic that federal courts may intervene in the state judicial process only to correct
wrongs of a constitutional dimension.").
156. The court's statement that the Constitution does not guarantee that only completely relia-
ble evidence will be placed before the jury, could be read as an implicit recognition that the
particular evidence received at trial was not wholly reliable. However, shortly thereafter, the
court noted that to have limited the expert's opinion to an assertion that the hairs were similar
"would have robbed the state of the full probative value of its evidence." 680 F.2d at 519.
157. 549 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1979). In Massey, the court held that the study was lacking in
foundational authority since the witness "did not know the nature and extent of the studies con-
ducted from which the statistics were gathered." Id at 680.
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so long as it is of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the particu-
lar field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject. 58 While a
court must make such a finding to satisfy the requirement of the Rule,
in criminal cases the inquiry must go further:
In criminal cases, a court's inquiry under Rule 703 must go be-
yond finding that hearsay relied on by an expert meets these stan-
dards. An expert's testimony that was based entirely on hearsay
reports, while it might satisfy Rule 703, would nevertheless violate a
defendant's constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses. The
Government could not, for example, simply produce a witness who
did nothing but summarize out-of-court statements made by others.
A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to an effective cross-
examination. '
59
None of the hesitancy of the DiGiacomo opinion was evident in
United States v. Green. 160 There, the defendant was charged with the
kidnapping and murder of a young woman. A forensic serologist testi-
fied that genetic markers consistent with the defendant's blood type
were found in the victim's car and on her sheet. In addition, "he testi-
fied as to the frequency of occurrence of those markers in the popula-
tion, which was comparatively rare."'
6'
On appeal, the defendant argued that the testimony regarding the
frequency of occurrence of the genetic markers was not reliable. Citing
neither case authority nor any of the Federal Rules, the court rejected
the argument:
The government furnished Green with all of its reports and test re-
sults, including an article written by the expert on the frequency of
occurrence of genetic markers in the population, so that he was
aware that this type of testimony might be introduced, and we find
that it was properly admitted. Green also contends that the testi-
mony was not reliable because the expert relied on a biological statis-
tician to determine an appropriate sample size in studying frequency
of occurrence since this was outside of his own area of expertise.
However, we find that the expert was not relying on someone else's
work, but that he only used it as recommendations in connection
with his own statistical studies. Therefore, we find the expert's testi-
mony was reliable. 162
In sum, neither DiGiacomo nor Green silences the various con-
cerns that many have voiced regarding the use of evidence of mathe-
158. See United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1150 (1982).
159. United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d at 302.
160. 680 F.2d 520 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1072 (1982). The trial was to the court, the
defendant having waived a jury.
161. Id. at 522.
162. 680 F.2d at 523.
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matical probabilities. It remains for future cases to give the kind of
critical analysis that was not necessary in DiGiacomo and was not un-
dertaken in Green.1
63
Finally, there is United States v. Bastan~pour,164 which illustrates
the breadth of Rule 703. There, a government chemist testified that the
substance in certain caviar tins was heroin. The opinion was based on
laboratory tests he personally performed and on information obtained
by way of computer. On cross-examination, it was revealed that the
expert did not recall the literature spectra upon which he based his
analysis and that he had lost or destroyed the "standard" spectra which
he had compared against the literature spectra. The expert also ac-
knowledged that he knew nothing about the program which caused the
computer to bring forth the information it produced.
The court of appeals rejected the defendant's claim that the failure
of the witness to retain the laboratory standards and test results and the
failure of the government to disclose technical information concerning
the patented computer programs of standard commercial laboratory in-
struments prevented his counsel from conducting a meaningful cross-
examination of the expert.
Holding that the trial court was within its discretion in admitting
the government's expert testimony under Rules 703 and 705, the court
distinguished cases holding that a computer program relating to test
data must be made available to the defense prior to trial so that it could
prepare to conduct an effective cross-examination of the expert witness.
In the court's view, those cases involved the admission of evidence of
computer printouts or direct testimony of results rather than opinion
testimony of an expert who had used what he characterized as recog-
nized instrumental techniques involving the use of a computer. 165
Lastly, the court rejected the dissenting opinion in Perma Research
and Development v. Singer Co. ,166 in which Judge Van Graafeiland
held that where a computer is programmed to produce information for
purposes of litigation, a court should not permit a witness to state the
results without having the program available at trial, and the party
should make the availability known in advance of trial. The Seventh
Circuit found more persuasive Mr. Justice Clark's opinion in which it
163. Evidence of statistical probabilities is to be distinguished from the use of extrapolation
evidence. See Illinois Physicians' Union v. Miller, 675 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1982); State of Georgia
v. Califano, 446 F. Supp. 404 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
164. 697 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1790 (1983).
165. 697 F.2d at 177.
166. 542 F.2d 111, 125 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976).
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was concluded that the trial judge had not abused his discretion in al-
lowing the experts to testify even though "it might have been better
practice" to deliver the data and theorems in advance of trial. 1
67
As in United States ex rel DiGiacomo v. Franzen,168 the court in
Bastanipour stressed the failure of defense counsel to advance mean-
ingful evidence to contradict the expert testimony:
It is difficult to believe that, in the words of Dioguardi, 428 F.2d
at 1038, there is 'an appreciable risk that prejudice resulted.' Not
only did defense counsel reject the proffer of a sample for testing.
The facts demonstrate that considerable effort was spent to conceal
the white powdery substance under the false bottoms of the caviar
tins. It is difficult, if not wholly unrealistic, to imagine that such en-
ergies would have been exerted if the matter in question were not
extremely valuable contraband. Under defendant's elaborate switch-
ing hypothesis, which involved the intricate substitution of decep-
tively similar wrapped tins and handwritten labels, any other
possibility would be even more remote.
16 9
VII. SPOLIATION AND THE DRAWING OF NEGATIVE INFERENCES BY
THE TRIER OF FACT
A.
The Federal Rules of Evidence have not entirely supplanted com-
mon law principles which still govern in the absence of an applicable
rule. 170 One of the most enduring of the common law principles is the
doctrine of spoliation. In essence, the doctrine provides that when a
litigant, in bad faith, has destroyed, fabricated, or suppressed evidence,
the trier of fact may draw an inference that the spoliator believes his
case is weak or unfounded.'
7 1
The principle has best been described by Dean Wigmore:
It has always been understood--the inference, indeed, is one of
the simplest in human experience-that a party's falsehood or other
fraud in the preparation and presentation of his cause, his fabrication
or suppression of evidence by bribery or spoliation, and all similar
conduct is receivable against him as an indication of his conscious-
ness that his case is a weak or unfounded one; and from that con-
sciousness may be inferred the fact itself of the cause's lack of truth
167. 542 F.2d at 115.
168. 680 F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 1982). Seesupra note 147, and accompanying text.
169. Baslanipour, 697 F.2d at 177.
170. See United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554, 558 (7th Cir. 1975).
171. The doctrine was often employed in early admiralty cases. See, e.g., The Pizarro, 15 U.S.
(2 Wheat.) 227 (1817); The Fortuna, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 236 (1818); The Cheshire, 70 U.S. (3
Wall.) 231 (1865); The Circassian, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 135 (1864); The Andromeda, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.)
481 (1864).
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and merit. The inference thus does not necessarily apply to any spe-
cific fact in the cause, but operates, indefinitely though strongly,
against the whole mass of alleged facts constituting his cause.
172
During the 1982-83 Term, the Seventh Circuit had before it sev-
eral cases involving this principle. The first was S. C. Johnson & Son
Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville RR Co. ,173 in which the plaintiff brought
an action against a carrier for damage to a shipment of Johnson prod-
ucts. In an attempt to determine the extent of the damage, one Man-
ske, a technical specialist in Johnson's quality control department,
performed tests on representative samplings of the damaged products.
As he performed the tests, Manske took notes regarding the condition
of the various products. These notes were used to prepare an internal
memorandum regarding the extent of the damage. After the prepara-
tion of the memorandum, Manske destroyed the notes since, as he
claimed at trial, the notes "were illegible to anyone but himself and
because all of the necessary information was contained in the
memorandum." 174
The district court concluded that Johnson had failed to prove its
damages with requisite certainty and entered judgment for the defend-
ant. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Grady relied, in part, on the
negative inferences he drew from Manske's destruction of his notes.
While the Seventh Circuit affirmed the ultimate conclusion that the
plaintiff's proof of damages was inadequate, it disagreed with the dis-
trict court's application of the doctrine of spoliation.
75
As the court of appeals noted, application of the doctrine involves
a two step process. First, the evidence must, of course, have been de-
stroyed. Second, and more importantly, the court must conclude that
the evidence was destroyed in bad faith. The crucial element is not the
172. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 278 at 133 (Chadbourn Rev. 1979) (emphasis in original).
See also Maguire & Vincent, Admissions Implied From Spoliation or Related Conduct, 45 YALE
L.J. 226 (1935).
173. 695 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1982).
174. Id at 256.
175. Id at 259. In explaining the doctrine, the majority stated that bad faith destruction of
documents allows the trier of fact to "infer from this state of mind that the contents ofthe evidence
would be unfavorable to that party if introduced in court." Id at 258 (emphasis added). The
court did not draw the distinction enunciated by Wigmore relating to the extent of the negative
inference. Wigmore distinguishes between conduct giving rise to negative inferences: On the one
hand is conduct indicating a consciousness of the weakness of the case in general, including brib-
ery, destruction of evidence, and the like; on the other, is conduct indicating a consciousness of the
weakness of a specific element in the cause, including failure to produce a particular witness or a
document and the like. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 172, § 278 at 133. The failure to note this distinc-
tion was probably inadvertent and in any event was of no consequence since, in the case before
the court, a negative inference relating to the contents of the document necessarily compelled a
negative inference as to the entire damage aspect of the case.
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destruction of the evidence, simpliciter, but the reasons for its destruc-
tion. 176 Before the trier of fact is justified in drawing negative infer-
ences from the destruction of evidence, it must be shown that there was
some reason to suppose that non-production would be used against the
non-producing party. 177
The court went on to hold that the facts surrounding Manske's
destruction of his notes did not support an inference of bad faith.178
The court cautioned that had Judge Grady found Manske to have been
an incredible witness, based on his demeanor, it would respect that
finding. 179 That not being the case, the court proceeded on the assump-
tion that Manske testified truthfully.
The court's emphasis on the almost inviolable nature of a district
court's credibility determinations based on demeanor should not be
overlooked. It has long been recognized that the trier of fact can con-
sider the manner in which a witness testifies as well as his conduct and
demeanor on the witness stand in resolving conflicting evidence. 80
Moreover,
the demeanor of a witness ... may satisfy the tribunal, not only that
the witness' testimony is not true, but that the truth is the opposite of
his story; for the denial of one, who has a motive to deny, may be
uttered with such hesitation, discomfort, arrogance or defiance, as to
give assurance that he is fabricating, and that, if he is, there is no
alternative but to assume the truth of what he denies. I8
176. See The Olinde Rodrigues, 174 U.S. 510, 528-29 (1899).
177. 695 F.2d at 258-59.
178. Id See also United States v. Bastanipour, 697 F.2d 170, 174 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 1790 (1983) (DEA agents' good faith destruction of notes not violative of Jencks Act
even though violated DEA's retention policy).
179. Id at 259. The power of a court to determine that a witness' testimony is inherently
incredible is not open to question. See, e.g., The Northern Trust Co. v. Garman, 643 F.2d 1252,
1260 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 910 (1981); United States v. Shoupe, 548 F.2d 636 (6th
Cir. 1977); Geigy Chemical Corp. v. Allen, 224 F.2d 110, 114 n.5 (5th Cir. 1955) ("If there be any
one thing in the administration of law upon which the decisions, the texts, and the general opinion
of the bench and bar are in agreement, it is that evidence which is inherently unbelievable or
incredible is in effect no evidence. . . . Courts are not required to believe that which . . . they
judicially know to be incredible."). Accord Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U.S. 417, 420 (1891);
Indiana Metal Products v. NLRB, 442 F.2d 46, 51-52 (7th Cir. 1971); Peters v. Fitzpatrick, 310
F.2d 704, 707 (7th Cir. 1962).
180. See Sartor v. Arkansas National Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 628 (1944); United States v.
Warwick, 695 F.2d 1063, 1067 (7th Cir. 1982); Ballou v. United States, 370 F.2d 659, 664 (6th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 83 F.R.D. 323,
339-40 (D.D.C. 1979); Oscar Gruss & Son v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 41 F.R.D. 279,
282 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See also Schulenberg v. Signatrol, Inc., 37 Ill. 2d 352, 226 N.E.2d 624, 626
(1967).
181. NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962). Accord United States v. Barham,
466 F.2d 1138, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926 (1973); United States v. Tropi-
ano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1075 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021 (1970); In re Bebar, 315 F.
Supp. 841, 844 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). This does not mean, however, that mere disbelief alone can serve
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By their very nature, credibility determinations based on de-
meanor are not generally susceptible of or subjected to appellate scru-
tiny and are given enormous deference, for as Justice Jackson has
incisively observed, "a few minutes' observation in the courtroom is
more informing than reams of cold record."' 182 Thus in fashioning
findings of fact pursuant to Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, lawyers involved in bench trials or injunction hearings should not
overlook the importance of demeanor "evidence". Properly drafted
Findings will go far toward insuring that the victory obtained in the
district court will not be overturned on appeal.
B.
Since at least Wilson v. United States, 8 3 it has been settled that
false statements by a defendant in explanation of his conduct are ad-
missible against him as tending circumstantially to indicate his guilt.
While there is no Federal Rule of Evidence which explicitly treats false
exculpatory statements, it is clear that they are a species of relevant
circumstantial evidence under Rule 401 and thus are admissible pursu-
ant to Rule 402.184 The more difficult question is the extent to which
this and similar sorts of evidence can be used as affirmative or substan-
tive proof.
The court briefly addressed this problem in United States v.
Green.185 There, the defendant admitted to the police two days after
in lieu of affirmative proof. See United States v. Green, 680 F.2d 520, 523-24 (7th Cir. 1983);
Pariso v. Towse, 45 F.2d 962, 964 (2d Cir. 1930).
182. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 171 (1943) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Cf., United
States v. Bruscino, 687 F.2d 938, 941 (7th Cir. 1982) (en banc). Where, however, factual conclu-
sions are made on the basis of documentary evidence, the same deference to a court's findings is
neither required nor shown. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 141-42
n.16 (1966); John R. Thompson Co. v. United States, 477 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1973) ("Since the
evidence in this case is all either documentary or in the form of physical exhibits we are in as good
a position as the trial court to examine it. ... ); Deep Welding, Inc. v. Sciaky Bros., Inc., 417
F.2d 1227, 1229 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037 (1970).
183. 162 U.S. 613 (1896). Professors Maguire and McCormick treat such statements and other
attempts to manufacture or suppress evidence as implied admissions. Wigmore classifies this as a
species of circumstantial evidence indicating consciousness of guilt. 2 WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 278
(3d ed. 1940). See also Maguire and Vincent, supra note 172. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson,
513 F.2d 819, 824 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Lacey, 459 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1972); Virgin Islands
v. Lovell, 378 F.2d 799 (3rd Cir. 1967); Young v. United States, 358 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1966);
United States v. McCorney, 329 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1964); Corey v. United States, 305 F.2d 232, 239
(9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 956 (1963); Rizzo v. United States, 304 F.2d 810, 830 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1961). See also United States v. Karigiannis, 430 F.2d 148, 151
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 904 (1970); United States v. Riso, 405 F.2d 134, 138 (7th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 959 (1969).
184. See I WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra note 12, 401[10] at 401-57.
185. 680 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1983).
EVIDENCE
the murder of a young girl, that shortly before her death, he had spo-
ken with her. He claimed that he had apologized to her for a sexually
suggestive remark and that in response, she had stabbed him in the
forearm with a knife. 86 In addition, he claimed that later in the eve-
ning, he had gone with friends to East St. Louis and later returned
home.
Two weeks later, the police informed Green that his story about
his friends, Saffold and Wright, and the trip to East St. Louis did not
stand up, whereupon Green recanted and said that Rhonda had
stabbed him at the El Cid Complex and that afterwards, he had gone
home and stayed there. Some days later, Green agreed to give a blood
test but failed to appear at the appointed place and time. Three days
later, he was indicted but was not apprehended until almost a year later
in New Orleans. Following his arrest, he gave a third version of the
events. 1
87
The case against the defendant was entirely circumstantial, 188 con-
sisting in part, of the various false exculpatory statements made to the
police. Based on all the evidence, the district court found the defend-
ant guilty.
On appeal, the defendant contended that his statements were inad-
missible-although the opinion of the court of appeals never explains
exactly why. In fact, the court blurs the difference between admissibil-
ity of the statements and the extent to which a conviction may be bot-
tomed on them. A reading of the entire portion of that aspect of the
decision reveals that what really was at issue was not the admissibility
of the false exculpatory statements, but rather the extent, if any, to
which they have independent substantive effect.
While the opinion treats these questions in summary fashion, 89 at
least this much is clear: A conviction based solely on statements of an
accused cannot stand, there must be independent evidence that a crime
has been committed. 190 While mere disbelief of the defendant's state-
ments cannot alone support a conviction, such disbelief is not
186. Id. at 521-22. The knife wounds in the defendant's arm were made with a weapon simi-
lar to that which inflicted the fatal wounds on the victim.
187. Id
188. The fact that evidence is wholly or partly circumstantial does not impose a greater or
more onerous burden on a party in a federal case since as the Supreme Court has held, circum-
stantial evidence stands on no different footing and is entitled to no less weight than direct evi-
dence. See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
189. Green, 680 F.2d at 523-24. The whole discussion of this issue is contained in a single
paragraph.
190. Id at 524. This is the familiar corpus delecti rule.
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irrelevant. 191
The court of appeals held that the defendant's inconsistent state-
ments "were an attempt to throw suspicion on others and tended to
show his own guilt."' 92 In addition, the detailed knowledge of the
events of the crime contained in these statements tended to show the
defendant's own guilt since had he not perpetrated the crime he could
not have had such detailed information. The conviction was affirmed
since the totality of the evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable
doubt the defendant's guilt.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The approach of the Seventh Circuit during the 1982-83 Term was
marked by flexibility in applying the Federal Rules of Evidence. That
flexibility not only makes good sense, but also is consonant with the
command of Rule 102 which mandates a construction of the rules that
secures fairness in administration, elimination of unnecessary expense
and delay and the promotion of the interstitial development eviden-
tiary principles in order that the truth be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined. In short, the decisions of the 1982-83 Term, while
abjuring "over-emphasis on the technique of legal rules in detail,"' 193
were "rightly merits-minded."' 9
4
191. See United States v. Johnson, 513 F.2d 819, 824 (2d Cir. 1975) (false exculpatory state-
ments have "independent probative force").
192. 680 F.2d at 524.
193. I WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 8a at 244-45.
194. i WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 12, 1 102[01] at 102-7.
